In a lively op-ed entitled “The New Pope Might Be Somewhat Like the Old Pope” (The New York Times, May 8, 2025), Daniel Gibson reminds readers the Catholic Church has always changed, and is always changing. Even though it prefers to classify this activity under the heading of ‘developing the teaching’ and ‘building on the deposit of faith.’

Mr. Gibson then cites a few big-time examples of this ‘development’: slavery, religious freedom, and usury.

Most of us immediately recognize the change around the first two. Slavery is a no-brainer, while religious freedom, at least as it is sometimes invoked, does still occasionally require a bit of sorting out.

But when was the last time you heard anything about usury?

It’s a old-timey word, a vestige of a bygone era. Yet once upon a time all faith traditions shared a prohibition against the charging of interest on a loan.

What we have now is a rather mild caution against charging ‘exorbitant’ interest that ‘unfairly enriches’ the lender.

But who decides what is exorbitant? Delegated to legislatures, that determination has been exposed to lobbying efforts by vested interests (a.k.a. the banking industry).

Another Christian work-around attempted in centuries past was a limited prohibition against charging anything more in interest that what the money lent could be expected to earn if used elsewhere by the lender during the term of the loan.

But given the rampant speculation in modern-day financial markets, how does one determine ‘anticipated earnings’?

If ever there was an aspect of Catholic Social Teaching in dire need of further development, it is this one.

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Joseph Rickaby describes the early development of mercantile enterprises in relation to usury, in his book Moral Philosophy, published in 1918.

As commerce increased in the great cities five centuries ago, conditions that render interest lawful, and not usurous, first presented themselves. But things were different outside of those cities because the level of commercial exchange was not as robust.

“Hence the same transaction, as described by the letter of the law, might mean lawful interest in the city, and usury out in the country — the two were so disconnected.”

Mr. Rickaby then gives the following overview of the development of Catholic practice, from approximately 1500 onward:

“In such a situation the legislator had to choose between forbidding interest here and allowing usury there; between restraining speculation and licensing oppression.

“The medieval legislator chose the former alternative (restraining speculation). Church and State together enacted a number of laws to restrain the taking of interest, laws that, like the clothes of infancy, are not to be scorned as absurd restrictions, merely because they are inapplicable now, and would not fit the modern growth of nations.”

Rickaby continues:

“At this day (1918) the State has repealed those laws, and the Church has officially signified that she no longer insists on them. Still she maintains dogmatically that there is such a sin as usury, and what it is, (remains) as defined in the Fifth Council of Lateran (1512–1517).”

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Assuming we can all agree that some lending is ‘predatory’ and some loans ‘unfairly enrich the lender,’ that leaves us in dire need of an updated definition of what constitutes usury, one that does fit the modern growth of nations.

Since nobody’s going back to The Fifth Lateran Council of 1512, expecting that definition to make sense for us today.

The conditions or opportunities for usury have increased exponentially since Joseph Rickaby wrote Moral Philosophy, with the introduction of widespread consumer credit, and the increased complexity of international finance.

In their best guise the former enables people of modest means to enjoy more of life’s conveniences, and the latter is an important mechanism of economic growth.

But exorbitant interest rates are making it impossible for individuals, and nations, to ever settle their debt obligations.

The Catholic Church is right to ‘maintain dogmatically’ that usury is still a destructive force having a deleterious effect, especially on the poor and downtrodden of the world.

But it needs to do more to help define what constitutes usury in the 21st Century.

The problem remains one of ‘restraining speculation’ and the ‘licensing (of) oppression.’

That the new Pope has selected the name Leo XIV leads me to hope he might add ‘redefining usury’ to his already-burgeoning agenda.